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Abstract 
 
This study uses detailed longitudinal matched employer-employee data to examine the impact of 
entrepreneurial experience on job assignments, careers, and wages. The results suggest that there are 
significant differences in career mobility between former business owners and workers who were always 
wage employees. Former business owners enter firms at higher job levels and progress faster up the 
hierarchy than wage employees without entrepreneurial experience. The majority of the former business 
owners find jobs in small firms. The return to business ownership experience is lower than the return to 
wage employee experience, thus suggesting that the labor market imposes a penalty for business 
ownership experience.  
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1. Introduction 
A considerable amount of theoretical and empirical work in economics focuses on 
individual choices between wage employment and business ownership (or entrepreneurship). 
Seminal work by Lucas (1978) and Jovanovic (1982) provide the basis for a significant stream 
of literature linking entrepreneurial ability to firm size dynamics, and the evolution of markets. 
Another literature stream examines the role played by pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards in 
the occupational choice between self-employment and wage employment (see, for instance, 
Rees and Shah, 1986; and Taylor, 1996). Work originating mostly in the management and 
organizational theory literatures increasingly focuses on the individual decision to exit 
entrepreneurship (Gimeno et al., 1997; McGrath, 1999) and on the characteristics of former 
business owners who re-enter entrepreneurship (see, for instance Westhead and Wright, 1998).  
Conversely, only a few recent studies examine how well individuals who forsake business 
ownership and return to wage employment fare in the labor market. Research comparing 
earnings of former business owners who have become wage employees with those of others of 
similar age and educational background who did not experience self-employment over their 
careers provides mixed results and generally fails to account systematically both for the 
matching between worker and firm characteristics, and the specifics of career dynamics within 
firms.  
The present study uses longitudinal matched employer-employee data that include detailed 
information about individuals’ backgrounds, job assignments, and career progress within firms 
to examine the impact of business ownership experience on job assignments, careers and wages. 
An explanation for the empirical evidence obtained is provided based on the extant theoretical 
literature, paying attention in particular to the framework proposed by Gibbons and Waldman 
(2006) with regard to task-specific human capital.  We largely follow the broad empirical 
strategy employed by Baker et al. (1994a; 1994b), asking three main questions that seek to 
account for the main features of the impact of business ownership experience on careers and 
wages: 
i. Are former business owners more or less likely to be assigned to higher levels in the 
firms’ hierarchies at the time of hiring than other workers of comparable 
characteristics? 
ii. Do former business owners progress up the job ladder faster or slower than other 
workers of comparable characteristics?  
iii. What is the overall return to business ownership experience in the labor market?  
The following section provides the background for this study and surveys the empirical 
literature examining wage incomes and the labor market performance of former business 
owners. The third section describes the dataset used in the present study. Section four presents 
empirical evidence on the role played by business ownership experience in the internal 
economics of the firm with regard to careers, while section five focuses on wages. Section 6 
provides some concluding remarks.  
For the purpose of the present study, we use a broad definition of entrepreneur, which 
deliberately overlaps with that of business owner, not delving into a conceptual distinction 
between those terms. The same applies for the definition of entrepreneurship, which must be 
understood in a broad economic sense. The terms ‘entrepreneur’ and ‘business owner’, as well 
as ‘entrepreneurship experience’ and ‘business ownership experience’ will be used 
interchangeably in the present work as including those individuals who report themselves as 
business owners, regardless of whether they have full or partial ownership, and have started, 
acquired or inherited the business.  
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2. Background 
2.1 Entrepreneurship and the Ability to Supervise and Coordinate 
While entrepreneurship’s links with risk/uncertainty and innovation have lately taken 
somewhat of a spotlight, entrepreneurial activities have also been connected with supervision 
and coordination tasks at least since the work of Say (1803/1971). In A Treatise on Political 
Economy or the Production, Distribution and Consumption of Wealth, the entrepreneur plays a 
central coordinating role both in production and distribution. Also within the firm, he is the 
coordinator and moreover, the modern leader and manager. Say is the first author to emphasize 
this managerial role for the entrepreneur. 
For Marshall (1890/1920), within the firm, the owner/entrepreneur bears all the 
responsibility and exercises all control. The entrepreneur directs production and he is both the 
manager and employer. Kaldor (1934) stresses that, in addition to uncertainty-bearing, the 
“entrepreneurial function” includes supervision and coordination. Supervision is necessary in 
the case of cooperative production in order to ensure that contracts already entered into should, 
in fact, be carried out. Coordination, on the other hand, is that part which determines what sort 
of contracts should be entered into.  
More recently, Lazear (2005) proposes a theory of entrepreneurship based on the view that 
entrepreneurship “is the process of assembling necessary factors of production consisting of 
human, physical, and information resources and doing so in an efficient manner” (Lazear, 2005, 
p. 649). An entrepreneur must possess the ability to combine talents and manage those of others. 
Furthermore, he must combine those talents with physical capital and ideas to create a new 
product or to produce an existing one at a lower or competitive cost. Because the entrepreneur 
must bring together many different resources, he must have knowledge, at least at a basic level, 
of a large number of business areas.  
Lazear's theory predicts that individuals with more balanced skill sets (i.e. generalists rather 
than specialists) are more likely to become entrepreneurs, and will enjoy higher entrepreneurial 
incomes. He tests the predictions of the theory using data on Stanford University alumni 
(Lazear, 2004; 2005) finding that those who have more varied work experience are more likely 
to be entrepreneurs; and students who study a more varied curriculum are more likely to become 
entrepreneurs. A further test of Lazear's theory is provided by Wagner (2003) based on a 
representative sample of the German working population.
2
 Wagner's findings give support to 
Lazear's theory, as the estimated probabilities of being self-employed are positively related with 
both the number of different kinds of professional training and the number of changes of 
professions.  
In a recent paper, Åstebro and Thompson (2011) suggest an alternative view to that of 
Lazear. They predict that those with greater taste for variety are more likely to invest in 
generalist skills and become entrepreneurs, but entrepreneurs will actually see their incomes 
decrease with greater skill variety. Using data from a survey of entrepreneurs and individuals 
from the general population, they confirm that entrepreneurs typically have a more varied labor 
market experience. However, the more varied their experience, the lower their household 
income.  
Regardless of the theory behind the motivation to become an entrepreneur, individuals with 
business ownership experience are more likely to have acquired the abilities necessary to 
organize a business, and lead, supervise, and coordinate others' efforts. Even if individuals are 
not endowed with the complete set of skills necessary to start and run a business, they can 
acquire those skills while doing it (Lazear, 2004). Both the views by Lazear (2005) and Åstebro 
and Thompson (2011) imply that human capital investment patterns should differ between those 
who end up being entrepreneurs and those who end up working for others. It may be possible 
that the exercise of business ownership provides former entrepreneurs with experience in 
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organizing, supervising and coordinating activities in firms. This experience could be valued by 
employing firms as a positive signal when hiring, promoting to the higher levels of their 
hierarchies, and establishing wages. Our paper aims to test these implications.  
 
2.2 Business Ownership Experience and Job Assignment, Wage, and Promotion Dynamics 
Comprehensive analyses of the internal organization of firms are found in works by 
Doeringer and Piore (1971); Rosenbaum (1984); and Baker et al. (1994a; 1994b).
3
 We are 
concerned with three main determinants that lead to specific worker-job matching – human 
capital, imperfect information, and the scale of operations of the firm – and how these factors 
affect the abilities held especially by those with business ownership experience – that of 
organizing, coordinating and supervising activities in firms. 
Human capital theory (Becker, 1962; 1964/1975; Ben-Porath, 1967) states that individuals 
can acquire productivity-enhancing abilities through education and on-the-job training. The 
assignment of workers to jobs in the economy should then occur as a result of the knowledge 
firms and workers have of the output from each specific worker-job match. However, such 
knowledge is usually imperfect (Spence, 1975). Workers may then be sorted into jobs through 
mechanisms of screening and signaling (Stiglitz, 1975; Spence, 1973), or a matching process of 
workers to jobs (Jovanovic, 1979; 1984). Baker et al. (1994a) provide evidence that firms use 
the job assignments of workers as a signal of ability (see also Waldman, 1984; Bernhardt, 
1995). It can then be argued that firms should seek those with organization and 
supervisory/coordination experience when filling up vacancies in managerial levels of the 
hierarchy which typically require these abilities. If business ownership is perceived as providing 
such abilities, then it is possible that entrepreneurial experience may be interpreted as a signal in 
the employment of supervisors/managers.  
The assignment of workers to jobs is also influenced by the scale of operations of firms. 
More resources (i.e. capital and labor) are allocated to workers with greater 
supervisory/coordination abilities (Mayer, 1960; Williamson, 1967; Rosen, 1981; Spurr, 1987). 
Such workers will have a greater impact on the firm’s output. The relationship between firm 
size and assignment of workers to jobs is also related to information asymmetries and 
compensation of workers within hierarchies, an argument originally put forward by Simon 
(1957). Calvo and Wellisz (1979) show that moral hazard occurs within firm hierarchies. Moral 
hazard provides a rationale for incentive mechanisms to avoid shirking that are particularly 
significant for workers in supervisory/coordination jobs (Harris and Holmstrom, 1982).  
Under perfect information, or with efficient screening/signaling and incentive mechanisms, 
the pecuniary value of human capital should translate into greater earnings (Mincer, 1974). If 
entrepreneurial experience provides individuals with specific skills in supervisory/coordination 
tasks, such experience may allow them to have a significant impact on firm productivity as 
wage employees. 
Gibbons and Waldman (1999) provide a general framework integrating job assignment, 
human-capital acquisition, and learning capturing several empirical findings concerning wage 
and promotion dynamics inside firms. In particular, their model provides a rationale for some 
important features of the internal economics of the firm (Baker et al., 1994a; 1994b): 
i. Job assignments (i.e. hierarchical levels) are a stronger determinant of wage levels 
than human capital or any other observed characteristic of workers; 
ii. There is a significant overlap between wages in adjacent hierarchical levels; and 
iii. Wage increases are serially correlated, and promotions are associated with large 
wage increases, but wage increases at promotion are small relative to the difference 
between average wages across levels of the job ladder.   
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 Other examples of studies on the internal labor markets include Lazear and Oyer (2004) using multi-
firm data, and Dohmen et al. (2004) and Lin (2005) using single firm data. Waldman (2010) presents an 
extensive discussion survey of the related literature. 
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In an extension to their model, Gibbons and Waldman (2006), show that the existence of 
task-specific human capital allows for the explanation of another characteristic of the internal 
economics of the firm: the existence of cohort effects. Studies by Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), 
and Baker et al. (1994b) show that a cohort’s average wage upon entering the firm is an 
important determinant of that same cohort’s average wage years later, independently of the 
cohorts' observable characteristics. The explanation for the cohort effect provided by Gibbons 
and Waldman (2004; 2006) is that human capital accumulation is task-specific and its effect on 
productivity diminishes the further up a worker climbs in the job ladder. Some of a worker’s 
acquired human capital goes unused when a worker is promoted and is assigned a new set of 
tasks. Hence, workers entering into lower levels in the job ladder accumulate human capital 
specific to the execution of tasks performed in those lower levels – being unlikely to acquire 
human capital specific to the supervisory/coordination activities required at higher levels. This 
means that their career progress will be slower than that of individuals who possess such human 
capital.
4
 It can then be suggested that, if some workers have acquired abilities specific to 
supervisory/coordination activities in the past, while being business owners, such workers have 
an advantage in progressing up the job ladder towards more managerial job levels.  
 
2.3 Business Ownership Experience and Wage Earnings 
Empirical work on the impact of business ownership experience on careers in firms is, to our 
knowledge, absent from the literature. Some recent work has examined the impact of such 
experience on individuals’ wages, while other studies have compared earnings in self-
employment with those in paid employment. In general these studies argue that business 
ownership experience should exert a negative influence on earnings, as wage employees benefit 
from on-the-job training while former business owners do not (Williams, 2000).  
In their path-breaking study, Evans and Leighton (1989) find no clear evidence that the 
return to experience in business ownership is different than the return to experience in wage 
work. When examining the possibility of a labor market ‘stigma’ for individuals with previous 
self-employment experience, Hamilton (2000) finds that a brief experience as a business owner 
yields a positive effect on subsequent wages as an employee, but that such effect wears away 
when long spells of entrepreneurial experience are considered. 
Only recently, empirical analyses have paid attention primarily to the effects of 
entrepreneurial experience on individuals’ earnings after they exit business ownership. 
Typically, empirical works on this subject find effects of business ownership experience on 
future employment earnings that are of small magnitude and weakly significant. Generally, even 
when positive, the effect of business ownership (or, in some cases, self-employment) experience 
on future wages is found to be smaller than the effect of past experience as a wage employee 
(Ferber and Waldfogel, 1998; Williams, 2000; 2004; Bruce and Schuetze, 2004; Hyytinen and 
Rouvinen, 2008; Kaiser and Malchow-Møller, 2011). However, with the exception of Kaiser 
and Malchow-Møller (2011), these studies do not provide evidence of where former business 
owners end up in the job assignment structure of firms. 
In general, the empirical evidence concerning the wage returns to business ownership 
experience is mixed and unfinished. The studies do not address features of the internal 
economics of firms such as job assignments and promotions, thus providing an incomplete 
picture of the role played by business ownership experience on wage and career dynamics. The 
present study contributes to the literature by addressing these issues. 
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 As Waldman (2010) stresses, this approach can also explain the economy-wide cohort effects and 
industry-level cohort effects found in recent papers such as Oyer (2006), Oreopoulos et al. (2008), and 
Kahn (2010). 
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3. Data 
The present study uses the Quadros de Pessoal (QP) micro-data, a Portuguese longitudinal 
matched employer-employee dataset including extensive information on the mobility of workers 
and business owners for the period 1986-2003.
5
 QP is gathered annually by the Portuguese 
Ministry of Labor and includes data from all private firms (and establishments) with at least one 
wage-earner. The dataset does not cover public administration. The survey collects detailed 
information on each individual employee (regular wages, subsidies, hours worked, date of 
admission, age, gender, schooling, qualification level, part-time status, job assignment, and type 
of collective agreement, among others). It also collects basic information about the 
establishment and the firm, such as size, ownership, sales turnover, International Standard 
Industrial Classification (ISIC) codes, and location.  
The present analysis uses information concerning the period 1995-2003. The employment 
and wage data refer to information provided by firms in the month of October of each year. The 
raw data used is organized in two datasets corresponding to the level of aggregation of the 
information: individual level and firm level. There are over 250,000 firms and two million 
workers in each annual survey who can be tracked over time through a unique identification 
number. Data on business owners and employees for each firm and establishment includes 
income (for employees), gender, age, occupation, tenure, educational attainment, and 
hierarchical levels. For both business owners and employees, records of wage employment and 
entrepreneurial experience can be collected, as well as information concerning labor market 
experiences following business ownership. The variable measuring experience (i.e. time) as 
wage employee is equal to age minus the sum of six, plus years of education, tenure, and years 
spent as a business owner. 
The Portuguese labor market is one of the most regulated markets in Europe, yet this 
regulation coexists with high wage flexibility. The institutional framework is characterized by 
national minimum wage enforcement, widespread trade union influence and extension of 
collective bargaining contracts. Cardoso (2006) and Cardoso and Portugal (2005) show that this 
institutional framework imposes weak constraints on wage setting. Micro conditions at the firm 
level are major determinants of the wage setting and make up for the relatively homogenous 
wage growth in collective bargaining (Cardoso, 2006). Firms often deviate from contractual 
wage negotiated in the collective contracts (Cardoso and Portugal, 2005). The difference 
between the contractual wage and the actual wage paid by firms ranges from 30% to 40% of the 
contractual wage. Firms’ wage-setting policy is largely determined by worker and firm 
attributes showing a high degree of freedom to adjust to market conditions experienced at the 
firm level. 
 
3.1 Sample 
Our initial sample comprises all young male individuals present in the data in 1995 who 
appear as employees in at least one year from 1986 to 2003, including those individuals who 
remain ever as employees and those who experience both wage employment and business 
ownership at different points in time. A panel was built to trace backwards the individuals’ 
experiences in the labor market – between 1986 and 1995.  
The period under scrutiny ranges from 1995 to 2003. This empirical study uses information 
on individuals who have entered the QP micro-data sometime between 1986 and 1995 in order 
to trace their backgrounds, building information on the initial stock of labor market experience. 
As an initial condition, it is guaranteed that this variable captures not only the number of years 
individuals are observed as employees or business owners in the dataset, but traces back the 
individuals’ complete work history in their current firms. 
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and Portugal (2002), Cabral and Mata (2003), Varejão and Portugal (2007), and Geroski et al. (2010). 
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We restrict the analysis males – who account for 61 percent of all individuals present in the 
dataset in 1995 – and who were aged between 16 and 25 years in 1986, corresponding to 40 
percent of the original sample. By excluding individuals over 25 years old, the analysis focuses 
on young individuals who have finished their formal education and have already entered the 
labor market. Moreover, it mitigates the issue of initial conditions arising from comparing 
individuals with very dissimilar work experiences and ages. We cannot reconstruct the career of 
the individuals prior to 1986.
 
For example, former jobs, past promotions or past experience as 
business owners are not available. We select only males for this study in order to avoid dealing 
with specificities concerning entrepreneurship and career differences by gender. In this way, we 
reduce the heterogeneity of the individuals under study. 
 
3.2 Former Business Owners and Wage Employees 
Part of the motivation of this study is based on the contention that former business owners 
own human capital that is distinguishable from that of wage employees. Table 1 presents the 
descriptive statistics for the complete sample (1995-2003), comparing former business owners 
with those individuals who were always wage employees. One particular issue that will be 
discussed in detail further on in this study is whether there is a wage ‘penalty’ affecting former 
business owners. At first sight, it seems clear that former business owners have higher earnings 
in comparison with individuals without any experience of owning a business.
6
  
 
Table 1 here 
 
Three binary variables capture the workers’ education, defined as: i) individuals who have 
completed compulsory education, which in Portugal, over the period under analysis, 
corresponds to a nine-year school enrolment; ii) individuals who have completed secondary 
education, which corresponds to a twelve-year school enrolment; and iii) individuals who have 
completed tertiary education, which usually corresponds to a five-year university/college 
degree. 
Generally, former business owners are better educated on average than individuals who were 
always on wage employment. Focusing exclusively on the higher level of education (university 
graduate), only a very small percentage of individuals have this degree (3.2 percent) and the 
proportion of former business owners with tertiary education is twice the same proportion for 
individuals who were always wage employees (6.4 percent vs. 3.2 percent). Finally, average 
experience in wage employment of former business owners is greater than for individuals who 
were never business owners, but former business owners are, on average, older than wage 
employees. 
Firm size is measured using the natural logarithm of the number of employees in the firm. As 
can be seen in Table 1, the majority of former business owners find employment in smaller 
firms when compared with wage employees. Table 2 presents the distribution of firms and 
workers across firm size categories. Micro and small firms (less than 50 employees) represent 
92.9 percent of all firms. It should be stressed that micro and small firms hire 71 percent of 
former business owners, compared with only 50.2 percent of wage employees, which is a 
sizable difference.  
 
Table 2 here 
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monthly paid hours, deflated using the Consumer Price Index. Overtime payments are not included. 
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4. Evidence on Job Assignments 
Two major objectives of this study are to determine: i) whether former business owners are 
assigned to higher levels in the firm’s hierarchy when they are hired, in comparison with other 
workers of similar characteristics; and ii) whether former business owners progress up the job 
ladder faster than other workers of comparable characteristics. To do so, it is necessary to 
analyze the distribution of hierarchical levels within the firm structure. In particular, it is 
important to be aware of which tasks are demanded of workers within each specific level, as 
well as which skills are required.
7
 
The information available in the data on employee’s job assignments (i.e. hierarchies within 
firms) consists of eight levels, from level one – apprentices – to level eight, which includes the 
top managers of the firm, that is those involved with strategic planning and organization-level 
leadership (which may or may not coincide with the business owner). As we go up the job 
ladder, task complexity, skill requirements, and the responsibility level increase. Levels six to 
eight may be considered managerial. Abilities associated with planning, organizing, supervising 
and coordinating activities become ever more required. Levels six and seven correspond to 
managing roles that, while possibly not requiring the kind of strategic vision and leadership 
associated with top managers, probably entail a strong component of supervisory/coordinating 
and group-level leadership abilities. This basically fits the rationale of Mintzberg (1973) in the 
sense that upper level jobs are usually associated with supervising and managing larger groups, 
coordinating across business units, and strategic planning; while lower level jobs depend more 
on specialized functional knowledge and performing less complex tasks. Table 3 presents the 
information on wage employees’ and former business owners’ hierarchical levels, disaggregated 
by firm size classes. 
 
Table 3 here 
 
The distribution of hierarchical levels is different for former business owners than for wage 
employees. A striking feature of the data is that the allocation of ex-business owners to top 
hierarchical levels is exceptionally high when compared with that of workers who were always 
wage employees. In particular, nearly 15 percent of former business owners fall into the top 
manager level (level eight), even when former business owners who have remained with the 
same business after selling it are excluded from the data.
8
 Only three percent of individuals who 
were never business owners are allocated to that top level. Moreover, about 27 percent of ex-
business owners in the sample are concentrated in the top three hierarchical levels. These may 
be considered the ‘managerial’ levels, the ones where leadership, supervisory and coordinating 
tasks are likely to represent most of the requirements. Only ten percent of other employees are 
allocated to those levels. The same pattern of job assignment is present across firm size; 
however, the differences in the top levels between former business owners and wage employees 
are more obvious in micro and small firms. This pattern of job assignment suggests an 
explanation to why a greater percentage of former business owners are employed in smaller 
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 QP micro-data discriminates the hierarchy in the firm as seen in Table A1 in the Annex to the paper, 
which provides a description of the job levels and the corresponding tasks and skills required by each 
level. The hierarchical levels comprise three dimensions: the type of task and its complexity; the level of 
responsibility/authority; and the skills necessary to perform the corresponding job. The eight levels are 
defined by the Ministry of Labor questionnaire filled by each firm as displayed in Table A1, and all firms 
have to use these levels when answering the survey. The objective of the Ministry of Labor is to have a 
common and comparable hierarchical structure across firms and there is no direct or prior connection with 
any type of wage setting process such as, for example, a central wage bargaining with unions. 
8
 All business owners in the sample under analysis have changed firms. We exclude all cases of business 
owners who sold their firm but stayed on as managers. 
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firms: if they are searching for a job at the top of the hierarchy (hierarchies predominantly 
display a pyramid-like shape) then their distribution across firm size is closer to the size 
distribution of firms than to the distribution of all workers across firm size. 
 
Table 4 here 
 
In order to check whether a relationship between the hierarchical level and worker’s tenure 
within the firm is identifiable, Table 4 displays the cross-share of tenure across hierarchical 
levels comparing the former business owners with those individuals who were always wage 
employees. It is possible to observe that, for the higher hierarchical levels – from highly-skilled 
professionals to top managers – the proportions at time of entry of former business owners are 
greater than those of workers who were always wage employees. As years of tenure increase, 
we observe the expected movement up the hierarchy for both types of workers, but former 
business owners are promoted more frequently than the workers who were never business 
owners. After five years, the share of former business owners who are top managers increases 
from 11 percent to 17 percent, while the share of workers who were never business owners goes 
from three percent to four percent. 
The relationship between tenure and hierarchical level is independent of the size of the firm 
given that the results are very similar for the three size categories and follow the trends detected 
earlier on Table 4. Former business owners concentrate in a larger share on the top three 
hierarchical levels than wage employees and, consequently, the share of wage employees in the 
non-managerial (i.e. supervisory/coordination) levels is greater than the corresponding share of 
former business owners.  
 
4.1 Entry 
We begin by analyzing the job assignment at entry through the estimation of an ordered 
probit to determine whether the differences observed between the two types of workers – with 
and without business ownership experience – are reflected in the estimates on past experience, 
controlling for the remaining individual attributes and the characteristics of the firm. Table 5 
presents the estimation results for job assignment at entry, disaggregating the effects of 
experience as business owner and experience as wage employee by considering one dummy 
variable for each year, ranging from one year to ten years or more. The dependent variable 
equals two if the worker is assigned to the top hierarchical level eight (the level where 
leadership skills/tasks dominate); equals one if the worker is assigned to hierarchical levels six 
or seven (the remaining managerial levels, where supervisory/coordination tasks dominate); and 
equals zero otherwise (levels one to five). All assignments occur at the moment of hiring (when 
tenure equals zero).  
 
Table 5 here 
 
Coefficients (measured as marginal effects) associated with former business ownership 
experience are always significant greater than those for experience as wage employee. For 
instance, a worker with two years of experience as a business owner has a probability of 
assignment to the top job level larger than 30 percent, while a worker with two years of 
experience as a wage employee only has a probability of assignment to the top job level of less 
than two percent. Moreover, a worker with two years of experience as a business owner has a 
probability of assignment to hierarchical levels six or seven of around 15 percent, whereas a 
worker with two years of experience as a wage employee only has a probability of assignment 
to these job levels of about two percent, again a sizable difference. These results suggest that 
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business ownership experience is more valued at the moment of hiring than prior wage 
employment experience. Moreover, at entry, the marginal effects of past business ownership 
experience on the probability of being assigned to level eight (top manager) are greater than the 
marginal effects for the probability of being assigned to levels six or seven, which suggests that 
business ownership experience seems to be even more relevant for strategic leadership roles 
than for those roles with a stronger organizational supervisory/coordinating component. Note 
also that the effect on the probability of being assigned to the top manager level increases with 
years of past experience as business owner, meaning that there is a process of skill 
accumulation.  
 
4.2 Promotions 
In the previous section it became clear that former business owners are more likely to be 
assigned to higher levels in the firms’ hierarchies at the time of hiring than wage employees of 
comparable characteristics. In this context, one plausible question arises: once entering a firm, 
do former business owners progress faster up the hierarchy? We can infer from Table 4 that 
former business owners spend less time at each hierarchical level than workers who were 
always wage employees, as the proportion of former business owners assigned to the top levels 
(especially to level eight) increases more than the same proportion for workers who remained 
always paid employees. 
 
 
To further investigate this issue, Table 6 presents ordered probit estimates for the probability 
of being promoted from the highest non-managerial level (level five) to the 
supervisory/coordinating levels (six and seven) and to the top manager hierarchical level (eight), 
including instances in which workers were promoted first from a non-managerial level to a 
supervisory/coordinating level, and then from this level to that of top manager. The estimations 
provide evidence of the relative magnitude of the effects of different types of experience by 
disaggregating the effects of tenure, experience as business owner, as well as experience as 
wage employee using dummy variables that range from one year to ten or more years.  
Estimation includes all workers assigned to the top non-managerial level (level five) at the 
time of hiring. Given that wage employees are clustered at the bottom of the hierarchy, we 
choose an entry hierarchical level close to the threshold level between non-managerial and 
managerial positions. In this way, the level upon firm entry does not confound the likelihood of 
promotion. The dependent variable equals two if the worker is promoted from the top non-
managerial level (five) to the top managerial level (eight), regardless of this promotion 
happening directly or in two stages (first from a non-managerial level to a 
supervisory/coordinating level, and then from this level to that of top manager); equals one if 
the worker is promoted from the top non-managerial level to a supervisory/coordinating level 
(six and seven); and zero otherwise (the worker remains assigned to the non-managerial level 
five).  
 
Table 6 here 
 
The estimation results show that the probability of being promoted from the top non-
managerial level to a managerial hierarchical level (six to eight) increases with tenure. The 
effect of business ownership experience on the probability of promotion to a managerial level is 
always higher than the corresponding effect for experience as a wage employee (which is not 
significant until the worker reaches six years of experience, and after that is always less than 
three percent), and increases with time spent in business ownership. Workers with superior 
amounts of experience as business owners have a higher probability of being promoted to the 
top managerial level (eight) when compared with the probability of promotion to the 
supervisory/coordinating levels six and seven. More specifically, for the first two years of 
business ownership experience, the partial effect of past business ownership experience is 
11 
 
similar for promotion to levels six and seven and promotion to level eight; when business 
ownership experience is higher than two years, the effect on the promotion probability is greater 
for promotion to the top level (eight). Moreover, the change of the marginal effects as years of 
business owner experience increase is higher for the promotion to the top managerial level – it 
ranges from nine percent for one year of experience to 26 percent for ten years or more, whereas 
the change in the promotion probability to supervisory/coordinating levels ranges from 11 to 17 
percent. 
A possible explanation for these results is that former business owners may possess a kind of 
task-specific human capital (Gibbons and Waldman, 2004; 2006). In particular, entrepreneurial 
experience may allow individuals to accumulate greater experience in planning, organizing, 
supervising, coordinating, and leading activities. Firms may use business ownership experience 
as an outside signal about the workers’ ability (Waldman, 1984; Bernhardt, 1995) to perform in 
higher hierarchical levels, and thus hire former business owners to higher job levels. The higher 
the job level a worker is assigned to, the more likely he is to acquire more 
supervisory/coordination ability. If this ability is a requirement for career progression, then 
former business owners, being more likely to have initially been assigned to a higher job level, 
should also progress faster up the job ladder. This effect is akin to the cohort effect highlighted 
by Gibbons and Waldman (2006). 
 
 
5. Evidence on Earnings 
We compare individual earnings using hourly wages (while in wage employment) over the 
period 1995-2003 as the variable of interest.
9
 We investigate whether experience as a business 
owner has a significant impact on the individuals’ earnings while wage employees. Wage 
equations are defined for all the periods after the reference year, i.e. from 1995-2003, providing 
a total of over 2.4 million observations. The explanatory variables include years of experience 
as a business owner and as a wage employee. We use these two indicators to determine the 
value of the two types of human capital. Other explanatory variables include individual 
characteristics such as education and tenure. We exclude firm characteristics and job assignment 
from the estimation since our objective is capturing the wage effect of former business 
ownership in the labor market. Moreover, in the context of our estimation, such variables are 
endogenous. 
 
5.1 Empirical Specification 
We specify a panel data model of wage determination as  
ititit vxw  )log(         (1) 
where i indexes worker and t indexes time period; wit is the hourly wage received by worker i in 
period t; xit is a vector of individual characteristics including education (three dummy variables), 
tenure (and its squared term), years of accumulated experience as a business owner (and its 
squared term), and years of accumulated experience as a wage employee (and its squared term); 
and vit is the error term. This last unobserved part of the model can be divided into two 
components: an individual effect, αi and an idiosyncratic error uit. These components define a 
composite error vit ≡ αi + uit.  
                                                 
9
 The dataset provides no information with regard to individuals’ earnings while in business ownership. 
As an example, if one individual in the dataset has a brief experience as a wage employee and, before 
1995, switches into business ownership and remains so thereafter, the model will drop this observation 
since there is no available information on this individual’s earnings after 1995. 
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The pooled ordinary least squares estimation (hereafter OLS) of equation (1) is consistent if 
there is no correlation between the regressors and vit, which implies assuming no correlation 
between the regressors and each component of the composite error. This assumption is unlikely 
to hold as, for example, education is probably correlated with individual unobserved 
heterogeneity αi. Nevertheless, the estimation of equation (1) by pooled OLS is reported to 
serve as a reference for comparing wage levels across individuals. 
Assuming strict exogeneity of the regressors conditional on the unobserved effects, 
  , T, t xu iitit  10,|E        (2) 
Equation (1) can be estimated by a fixed effects model as 
itiitit uxw  )log(        (3) 
Our objective is to account for worker unobserved heterogeneity and obtain within 
estimators. We discuss below how the coefficients are identified and their interpretation.  
 
5.2 Rewards to Business Ownership Experience 
This sub-section introduces wage equations and begins by analyzing the moment of entry 
into the firm. Only workers with one year or less of tenure are included in the regressions 
presented in Column 1 of Table 7. The advantage of estimating wages at entry is that the results 
are not affected by tenure. Column 1 explains wages based on individual characteristics, such as 
education, experience as business owner, and experience as employee.
10
  
 
Table 7 here 
 
In general, the statistically significant variables associated with the accumulation of human 
capital have a positive effect on entry wages. Experience as wage employee shows decreasing 
returns, as the coefficients of the quadratic term is negative. The return starts at five percent and 
increases until 29 years of experience. Experience as a business owner shows a fairly constant 
return of less than one percent, given that the square term is not significant. Employers seem to 
value business ownership less than wage employment experience, thus penalizing 
entrepreneurial experience with a lower wage premium at the moment of hiring.
11
 
In order to understand the effect of business ownership experience on wages, in this section 
we also present wage equations for the period 1995-2003 for all workers (without any 
restriction on tenure). The differences between former business owners and wage employees are 
a critical issue in the context of this study. It is therefore relevant to understand whether those 
individuals who had a first experience as business owners over the period 1995-2003 (about 
3,000 observations) have some idiosyncratic characteristic which is not captured through human 
capital variables. If that is the case, we would be facing a selection issue. One way to deal with 
this question is through the introduction of a dummy variable discriminating those individuals 
who will become business owners when estimating wages during the period on wage 
employment prior to their first business ownership experience. If this dummy variable is 
statistically significant, it means that these individuals a priori are different from the remaining 
individuals, since they possess some unobserved characteristic which awards them greater 
earnings. Estimation results show that this variable is not significant, which means that future 
business owners are not initially different from other individuals. They become different only 
                                                 
10
 Squared terms are included to control for non-linear coefficients. 
11
 The two returns only crossover after 35 years of experience. 
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after a spell in business ownership, and are then recognized as so.
12
 This result implies that there 
is not a selection issue, at least for the period before acquiring business ownership experience. 
Furthermore, if there is no correlation between unobserved worker ability and future business 
ownership experience, it points to a legitimate causal interpretation of the results arising from 
the wage regressions estimated below.   
The results of Column 2 of Table 7 present wage levels equations estimated by pooled OLS, 
controlling for tenure, tenure squared, education, and labor market experience variables, namely 
experience as business owner, experience as employee and the two corresponding squared 
terms. As with a typical wage regression, the variables associated with the accumulation of 
human capital have a positive, statistically significant effect on wages. Tenure and experience as 
employee show decreasing returns. The return to experience as wage employee starts at three 
percent and increases until 50 years of experience. The linear effect of experience as business 
owner is negative and the quadratic is positive, implying a starting negative return of one 
percent and becoming positive in the fifth year of experience. However, the effect of business 
owner experience is lower than the effect of wage employee experience. This relationship 
reverses at 17 years of experience, which is too far from the range of values used for the 
estimation, rendering a low precision for the estimates. Therefore, at first glance, evidence 
seems to confirm the idea that past experience as a business is associated with a wage penalty.
13
  
 
5.3 Rewards Accounting for Worker Fixed Effects 
The focus of this section is on fixed effects estimation, since the panel of individuals allows 
us to account for individual unobserved heterogeneity, as shown in equation (3) and presented 
on Column 3 of Table 7. We follow more than 450 thousand workers between 1995 and 2003, 
totaling 2.4 million observations. This gives us enough information to identify the within 
coefficients of the regression. In particular, when a worker moves from a firm to another, the 
movement contributes to the identification of the return to wage employee experience – the 
tenure in the former firm becomes experience. When a worker decides to create a business (in 
the period 1995-2003) and again moves to wage employment, he accumulates business 
ownership experience, allowing the identification of the respective coefficient. We expect that 
the worker fixed effect captures part of the non-randomness of these movements. However, 
some bias will remain – especially when the identification of the coefficients rests on a specific 
group of individuals – so we need to be cautious about the interpretation of the results. 
The return to wage employment experience is positive but decreasing. It starts at 1.6 percent, 
increases 1.5 percentage points for the second year of experience and decays to zero as it 
approaches 18 years of experience. In contrast, the return to business ownership experience 
starts with a return close to zero in the first two years, but increases after that. In the first five 
years, the return is lower than the return to wage employment experience. In the sixth year of 
experience, the return of the ex-business owner experience is 11 percent and the return of the 
wage employment is nine percent. We estimate the same fixed effects regression separating the 
years of tenure and experience with a binary variable for each year and obtain similar results.
14
 
As we mention above, some caution is required in interpreting these results. The average period 
of experience as business owner is 3.5 years with a standard deviation of 2.3 (Table 1). At this 
average, the return to business owner experience is three percent and the return to wage 
                                                 
12
 This regression has also been conducted for each year of the time period. The dummy variables 
accounting for those individuals yet to become business owners were always non-significant. Results are 
available from the authors upon request. 
13
 As the effect of experience is assumed to be quadratic in the previous estimations and the results can be 
driven by that assumption, a model was estimated using an indicator variable (0, 1) defined for each year 
of tenure and experience – both as business owner and wage worker. The results (not reported here but 
available from the authors upon request) are very close to the ones obtained using the quadratic 
specification. 
14
 Results are available from the authors.  
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employee experience is five percent (if we consider the same 3.5 years of wage employment 
experience), a clear advantage for those with employee experience. If we take into consideration 
the distribution of business ownership experience, only a small fraction of the ex-business 
owners will increase their stock of experience above the five years.  
Overall, the value of business ownership experience in the market is lower than the value of 
wage employment experience. The results on job assignment (Section 4) show that business 
ownership experience increases the probability of entering the firm at (or be promoted to) a top 
hierarchical level. In micro and small firms, where former business owners predominantly find 
jobs (see Table 2), they can earn more than their co-workers by using their coordination and 
leadership skills. However when they are compared with similar workers in the market, 
irrespective of firm characteristics or job assignment, they earn less. The results on earnings also 
show that there is a specific group of former business owners who fare better in the labor 
market: those who have already accumulated sufficient leadership experience to enter the firm 
(or be promoted) to higher top hierarchical levels (in better paying firms). The identification of 
this kind of former business owners deserves more research, but is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
This study examines the effect of business ownership experience on careers and earnings 
compared with wage employment experience. We look at the moment of entry and at career and 
wage progression within firms for workers who were business owners for at least one year and 
for workers who were never business owners. The results suggest that there are significant 
differences in career outlines between these two groups. Former business owners have a higher 
probability of entering a firm at a managerial job level than other workers and progress faster up 
the job ladder. With respect to earnings, the labor market seems to impose a penalty for business 
ownership experience. When we do not control for firm characteristics and job assignment, 
former business owners have a lower return for their experience as compared with the return to 
the experience as wage employee. So, even though former business owners hold a job 
assignment advantage, they are predominantly employed by smaller firms which render a 
smaller return to business ownership experience in the labor market.  
Further work is necessary to address some unanswered questions. We find that for a specific 
group of workers, with longer time spent as business owners, the return to their experience was 
higher than the return to wage employment experience. It should be examined whether this is 
due to some selection bias (or an artifact of the sample) or if the length of business ownership 
experience allows for the accumulation of leadership skills rewarded by the labor market. 
Another issue regards success in business ownership. The present study does not distinguish 
between former business owners who closed their business due to lack of financial viability 
from those who sold or closed successful businesses. Performance in wage employment may 
differ between successful and unsuccessful former business owners. It should also be examined 
which industries hire former business owners and whether they are hired by firms in the same 
industries where they developed their entrepreneurial activity. Such work would shed light on 
the interaction between business ownership experience and industry-specific experience as 
sources of human capital acquisition. The information on different kinds of entrepreneurial 
history – length of the experience, the reasons to terminate it, the characteristics of the firms 
previously owned – offer paths to future research. 
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Annex 
Table A1 Job (hierarchical) levels 
Level Tasks Skills 
   
8  Top managers Definition of the firm general 
policy or consulting on the 
organization of the firm.  
Strategic planning. 
Creation or adaptation of 
technical, scientific and 
administrative methods or 
processes. 
 
Knowledge of management and 
coordination of firm’s 
fundamental activities. 
Knowledge of management and 
coordination of the fundamental 
activities in the field to which the 
individual is assigned and that 
requires the study and research 
of high responsibility and 
technical level problems. 
   
7  Intermediary managers Organization and adaptation of 
the guidelines established by the 
superiors and directly linked with 
the executive work. 
Technical and professional 
qualifications directed to 
executive, research, and 
management work. 
   
6  Supervisors, team leaders, 
foremen 
Orientation and supervision of 
teams, as directed by superiors, 
but requiring the knowledge of 
tasks.  
Complete professional 
qualification with a 
specialization. 
   
5  Higher-qualified 
professionals 
Tasks requiring a high technical 
value and defined in general 
terms by superiors.  
Complete professional 
qualification with a specialization 
adding to theoretical and applied 
knowledge. 
   
4  Qualified professionals Complex or delicate tasks, 
usually not repetitive and 
defined by superiors.  
Complete professional 
qualification implying theoretical 
and applied knowledge. 
   
3  Semi-qualified  professionals Well defined tasks, mainly 
manual or mechanical with low 
complexity, usually routine and 
sometimes repetitive.  
Professional qualification in a 
limited field or practical and 
elementary professional 
knowledge. 
   
2  Non-qualified professionals Simple tasks, diverse and 
usually not specified, totally 
determined. 
Practical knowledge and easily 
acquired in a short time. 
   
1  Apprentices, interns, 
trainees 
Training for a specific task Identical, but without practice, to 
the professional of the 
qualification level they will be 
assigned 
 
Notes: Hierarchical levels as defined by law  Decreto Lei 121/78 of July 2.  
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics, 1995-2003 
Variables All workers Former business owners Wage employees 
Wage per hour (logarithm) 1.389 1.439 1.388 
 [0.546] [0.606] [0.545] 
Age 30.176 33.073 30.138 
 [5.336] [4.459] [5.336] 
Tenure 7.021 5.913 7.035 
 [5.108] [5.750] [5.111] 
9-years education 0.166 0.187 0.166 
 [0.372] [0.390] [0.372] 
Secondary education  0.167 0.191 0.166 
 [0.373] [0.393] [0.372] 
College education  0.032 0.064 0.032 
 [0.177] [0.244] [0.176] 
Experience as business owner 1.032 3.495 -- 
 [0.380] [2.269] -- 
Experience as employee 12.134 13.074 12.122 
 [6.318] [6.488] [6.315] 
Firm size (logarithm) 4.205 3.164 4.218 
 [2.226] [1.871] [2.227] 
N  2,414,623 30,904 2,383,719 
 
Notes: Standard deviation between brackets underneath the mean. Hourly wage is calculated by 
dividing the sum of base wage with regular payments by the number of monthly paid hours, deflated using 
the Consumer Price Index. Tenure, experience as business owner, and potential experience as employee 
are measured in years. 9-years of education, secondary education, and college education are defined as 
dummy variables. 
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Table 2 Firms and workers, 1995-2003 
Firm size class Firms All workers 
Former business 
owners 
Wage employees 
Micro & small 
firms  
157,203 92.9% 1,217,933 50.4% 21,947 71.0% 1,195,986 50.2% 
Medium firms  11,434 6.8% 743,298 30.8% 6,651 21.5% 736,647 30.9% 
Large firms  552 0.3% 453,392 18.8% 2,306 7.5% 451,086 18.9% 
Total 169,189 100% 2,414,623 100% 30,904 100% 2,383,719 100% 
 
Notes: Firm size is divided into three classes: micro and small firms, medium firms, and large firms. Micro and 
small firms are those firms with less than 50 employees. Medium firms are those firms between 50 and 499 
employees. Large firms are those firms with more than or equal to 500 employees.  
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Table 3 Hierarchical levels and firm size, 1995-2003 
Hierarchical level 
Firm size (number of employees) 
All < 50 [50-500[ ≥ 500 
Former business owners     
   1: apprentices, interns, trainees 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 
   2: non-skilled professionals 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.15 
   3: semi-skilled professionals 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10 
   4: skilled professionals 0.50 0.52 0.44 0.43 
   5: higher-skilled professionals 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.08 
   6: supervisors and team leaders 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.07 
   7: intermediary managers 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
   8: top managers 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.10 
Wage employees     
   1: apprentices, interns, trainees 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.01 
   2: non-skilled professionals 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 
   3: semi-skilled professionals 0.14 0.11 0.17 0.15 
   4: skilled professionals 0.54 0.59 0.50 0.47 
   5: higher-skilled professionals 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.11 
   6: supervisors and team leaders 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.06 
   7: intermediary managers 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.05 
   8: top managers 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.05 
 
Notes: Each column presents the distribution of workers across hierarchical levels for former business 
owners and the remaining employees (the ‘wage employees’) calculated at different firm sizes.  
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Table 4 Hierarchical level and tenure, 1995-2003 
Hierarchical level 
Tenure 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Former business owners       
   1: apprentices, interns and trainees 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 
   2: non-skilled professionals 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 
   3: semi-skilled professionals 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 
   4: skilled professionals 0.51 0.52 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.48 
   5: higher-skilled professionals 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.07 
   6: supervisors and team leaders 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
   7: intermediary managers 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 
   8: top managers 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 
Wage employees       
   1: apprentices, interns and trainees 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.06 
   2: non-skilled professionals 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.08 
   3: semi-skilled professionals 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15 
   4: skilled professionals 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.54 
   5: higher-skilled professionals 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 
   6: supervisors and team leaders 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 
   7: intermediary managers 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
   8: top managers 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 
Notes: Each column presents the distribution of workers across hierarchical levels for former business 
owners and the remaining employees (the ‘wage employees’) calculated at tenure between zero years (the 
employee’s entry year) and five years.  
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Table 5 Ordered probit for job assignment at entry (marginal effects)  
Variables (dummies) 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 6 years 7 years 8 years 9 years ≥10 years 
           
Worker is assigned to top hierarchical level (leadership level) 
BO Experience 0.6282*** 0.3284*** 0.3624*** 0.4321*** 0.5085*** 0.5057*** 0.5645*** 0.5830*** 0.6828*** 0.7633*** 
 [0.0062] [0.0142] [0.0164] [0.0201] [0.0238] [0.0260] [0.0307] [0.0330] [0.0358] [0.0163] 
Employee experience 0.0059 0.0125 0.0165* 0.0285*** 0.0370*** 0.0466*** 0.0588*** 0.0625*** 0.0749*** 0.0377*** 
 [0.0074] [0.0082] [0.0085] [0.0103] [0.0115] [0.0127] [0.0141] [0.0145] [0.0159] [0.0022] 
           
Worker is assigned to hierarchical levels six or seven (supervision levels) 
BO Experience  0.1246*** 0.1518*** 0.1531*** 0.1513*** 0.1428*** 0.1431*** 0.1324*** 0.1283*** 0.1004*** 0.0718*** 
 [0.0018] [0.0016] [0.0013] [0.0019] [0.0038] [0.0041] [0.0066] [0.0077] [0.0118] [0.0067] 
Employee experience 0.0079 0.0160* 0.0206** 0.0333*** 0.0415*** 0.0502*** 0.0604*** 0.0633*** 0.0726*** 0.0586*** 
 [0.0094] [0.0096] [0.0096] [0.0103] [0.0107] [0.0109] [0.0111] [0.0112] [0.0112] [0.0033] 
Observations 314,356          
Wald χ-squared 48345.96          
Pseudo R-squared 0.332          
 
Notes: Dependent variable equals two if the worker is assigned to top hierarchical level eight (leadership level), equals one if the worker is assigned to hierarchical levels six or 
seven (supervision levels), and zero otherwise (levels one to five), at the moment of hiring (tenure = 0). Experience as business owner and experience as employee are defined 
as dummy variables ranging from one year to ten or more years. Estimations also include 9-years of education, secondary education, college education, firm size, industry and 
region dummies. Standard errors are in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 6 Ordered probit for promotion (marginal effects)  
Variables (dummies) 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 6 years 7 years 8 years 9 years ≥10 years 
           
Worker is promoted to top hierarchical level (leadership level) 
Tenure 0.2102*** 0.3109*** 0.3404*** 0.3746*** 0.3800*** 0.3987*** 0.3856*** 0.3852*** 0.3980*** 0.2428*** 
 [0.0287] [0.0339] [0.0349] [0.0357] [0.0357] [0.0363] [0.0360] [0.0359] [0.0365] [0.0209] 
BO Experience 0.0946*** 0.1373*** 0.1902*** 0.1702*** 0.2797*** 0.2211*** 0.2556*** 0.3323*** 0.2640*** 0.2555*** 
 [0.0103] [0.0176] [0.0272] [0.0240] [0.0353] [0.0373] [0.0487] [0.0537] [0.0520] [0.0394] 
Employee experience -0.0009 0.0036 0.002 0.0024 0.0027 0.0012 0.0067** 0.0048 0.0073** 0.0117*** 
 [0.0028] [0.0031] [0.0028] [0.0028] [0.0028] [0.0027] [0.0031] [0.0031] [0.0033] [0.0026] 
           
Worker is promoted to hierarchical levels six or seven (supervision levels) 
Tenure 0.1700*** 0.1910*** 0.1935*** 0.1945*** 0.1951*** 0.1939*** 0.1947*** 0.1950*** 0.1936*** 0.2108*** 
 [0.0101] [0.0048] [0.0036] [0.0028] [0.0028] [0.0030] [0.0028] [0.0028] [0.0030] [0.0075] 
BO Experience  0.1074*** 0.1338*** 0.1569*** 0.1491*** 0.1782*** 0.1663*** 0.1742*** 0.1826*** 0.1756*** 0.1742*** 
 [0.0075] [0.0094] [0.0098] [0.0100] [0.0054] [0.0102] [0.0095] [0.0034] [0.0092] [0.0078] 
Employee experience -0.0016 0.0065 0.0036 0.0044 0.0049 0.0022 0.0118** 0.0086 0.0129** 0.0215*** 
 [0.0053] [0.0054] [0.0051] [0.0050] [0.0050] [0.0049] [0.0053] [0.0053] [0.0056] [0.0046] 
Observations 156,412          
Wald χ-squared 4947.88          
Pseudo R-squared 0.096          
 
Notes: Dependent variable equals two if the individual is promoted from a non-managerial level (level five) to the top manager level (level eight), regardless of this promotion 
happening directly or first from a level five to a supervisory/coordinating level, and then from this level to that of top manager; equals one if the worker is promoted from a non-
managerial level (level five) to a supervisory/coordinating level (level six and seven); and zero if the worker remains assigned to the non-managerial level (level five). Tenure, 
experience as business owner and experience as employee are defined as dummy variables ranging from one year to ten or more years. Estimations also include 9-years of 
education, secondary education, college education, firm size, industry and region dummies. Standard errors are in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
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Table 7 Wage equations 
Variables 
Entry 
(1) 
Pooled, 1995-2003 
(2) 
Worker fixed-effects 
(3) 
Tenure  0.0466*** 0.0127*** 
  [0.0003] [0.000] 
Tenure
2 
x 10
-2
  -0.0769*** -0.0514*** 
  [0.0015] [0.001] 
9-years education  0.2005*** 0.3226*** 0.0292*** 
 [0.0023] [0.0015] [0.002] 
Secondary education  0.5008*** 0.6761*** 0.0688*** 
 [0.0033] [0.0020] [0.003] 
College education  1.3304*** 1.4612*** 0.1873*** 
 [0.0075] [0.0038] [0.005] 
Experience as business owner 0.0074* -0.0122*** -0.0058 
 [0.0043] [0.0033] [0.009] 
Experience as business owner
2 
x 10
-
2
 0.0341 0.2507*** 0.3904* 
 [0.0517] [0.0387] [0.212] 
Experience as employee 0.0494*** 0.0342*** 0.0168*** 
 [0.0006] [0.0003] [0.000] 
Experience as employee
2 
x 10
-2
 -0.0898*** -0.0350*** -0.0478*** 
 [0.0019] [0.0012] [0.001] 
    
Intercept 0.5057*** 0.5628*** 1.0686*** 
 [0.0048] [0.0025] [0.005] 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 
(no. of workers) 
295,409 
 
2,414,623 
 
2,414,623 
(452,282) 
F test 4442.36 26072.06 16002.73 
R-squared 0.262 0.354 0.211 
     Notes: Dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly wage (column (1) in the year of hiring; column (2) 
all workers polled for 1995-2003; column (3) for the worker fixed effects). Experience as business owner, 
experience as employee, and tenure are measured in years. 9-years of education, secondary education, 
and college education are defined as dummy variables. Robust standard errors are in brackets. * 
Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
